

Solidarity and Prosocial Behavior

An Integration of Sociological and
Psychological Perspectives

CHAPTER 1

Solidarity and Prosocial Behavior: A Framing Approach

*Siegwart Lindenberg, Detlef Fetchenhauer,
Andreas Flache, and Abraham P. Buunk*

This book is about what sociologists call solidarity and social psychologists call prosocial behavior. Any group or society heavily depends on the willingness of its members to help others in need, to contribute to a common good, to show themselves worthy of trust, and to be fair and considerate. While this is widely recognized, it is less obvious what makes people behave solidarily in one situation and keeps them from acting solidarily in another situation.

It was our intention to offer a fresh look at this age-old question by focusing on the cognitive processes that influence an actor's degree of solidarity and that mediate the influence of both the personality of a given actor and the situation in which a behavior takes place. One conclusion from such a perspective is that we all are to some degree like Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde (i.e., we are able to be highly altruistic in some situations but are brutally selfish in others). In the studies presented in this book, we focused on goal framing and mental models as two corresponding mechanisms that allow us to switch our solidary behavior between situations and relationships. Goal framing denotes cognitive processes (such as selective attention or selective activation of knowledge structures) related to the realization of particular goals. A mental model refers to a particular idea actors have of the sort of relationship they are in and the behaviors and expectations that are appropriate within this relationship. For example, in the workplace, members of work teams often have two main goals: Getting the job done and maintaining smooth social relationships with colleagues. However, the outcome of group work may change radically when workers initially frame the situation primarily in terms of task output, but then switch their attention to social relations, or vice versa. Correspondingly, workers may hold a mental model of their peer relations in terms of "friendship" (putting priority on ties above task) or in terms of "professional

To explore the important role that cognitive processes like framing and mental models may play in the explanation of prosocial and solidary behavior, sociologists and psychologists have joined forces in this book, as neither discipline alone is able to cover the whole spectrum of theoretical questions that are involved in such an explanation. This new approach offers new insights into the conditions that make or break solidary behavior and it offers a paradigm for the integration of insights from a number of overlapping generations of research on the topic within sociology, economics, psychology, and evolutionary theory.

Existing Approaches to Prosocial and Solidary Behavior

Let us briefly recount these approaches. Within sociology, the question of how and when solidary and prosocial behavior arises or fails to arise has traditionally been the core business of sociologists like Durkheim (1893/1964, 1897/1970) and Parsons (see Parsons and Shils, 1951). Their answers basically focused on processes of *socialization* in which norms are internalized, and prosocial personalities are formed. The failure of solidarity is then a failure of socialization, personality formation, or both (for recent expressions of this view, see Hoffmann [1983] or Gottfredson and Hirschi [1990]).

The answers generated by the socialization approach were an important advance, but they were not quite satisfactory because they failed to explain the influence of changing situations. For example, when many people have to contribute to create a jointly desired outcome, people often free-ride even though they may have been socialized very well (Olson, 1965). In such "social dilemma" (Dawes, 1980) situations in which nonsocial behavior is good for each group member but bad for the group as a whole, it may be better to look at people's self-interest rather than at their socialization. This is exactly what happened in the 1970s. The major paradigm for investigating what was then called "cooperative" behavior (in social dilemma situations) leaned heavily on *rational choice* theory from economics and game theory rather than on socialization theory (e.g., Axelrod, 1984; Coleman, 1990; Hechter, 1987). Rational choice could handle situational aspects very well, especially variations in incentives to act cooperatively. Here, too, considerable advances were made. Yet, a problem with the rational choice approach was that it could not accommodate cooperative behavior in situations in which self-interest was not served by cooperative behavior (Camerer, 2003; Frank, 1988). For these reasons, new developments in *evolutionary biology* soon seemed relevant to the study of cooperative behavior, especially the idea that some forms of solidary behavior may have become "hardwired" in the course of evolution

the individual to the level of the gene, which maximizes inclusive fitness (Dawkins, 1976). The central idea here was that a genetic predisposition toward altruistic behavior can survive and spread in a population as long as this behavior favors reproduction and survival of the organism that bears the gene (Hamilton, 1964). This left the possibility open that the individual was at least partially altruistic "in the service" of the selfish gene. Scholars from all social and behavioral sciences were inspired by evolutionary biology, leading to a considerable growth of insights into all sorts of "prosocial" or solidary behavior, and not just the contribution to collective goods in social dilemma situations (Gintis, 2003). Once again, however, the situational influences on solidary behavior (other than group identity) were pushed into the background.

Within social psychology, the field was dominated for a long time by the attempt to identify situational determinants of helping behavior. In addition, social psychologists put much effort into determining whether pure altruism ever exists. Is human behavior ultimately always governed by an egoistic motive system or are humans willing to act altruistically even if they are not rewarded for such behavior? Within this line of research, social psychologists focused not only on material rewards for helping others, but also on internal rewards that might result from prosocial behavior (e.g., the warm glow of being a moral person or the avoidance of feeling guilty). Especially Batson (1991) empathically argued that true altruism really exists and that it is triggered by empathic concern for a person in need. This "empathy altruism hypothesis" was confirmed in many empirical studies and experiments (for an overview, see Batson, 1991; Bierhoff, 2002; but see Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997 for a fundamental critique on Batson's work).

Another important line of research is related to the development of prosocial and solidary behavior in children and juveniles. Based on the work of Piaget and Kohlberg, it was investigated how the level of prosocial behavior is related to children's and adolescents' sociocognitive development (Eisenberg and Fabes, 1998). It was shown that young children mainly base their moral judgment and moral behavior on the consequences of their behavior for themselves (e.g., if a certain behavior is punished it is judged to be bad). Later, children tend to evaluate adherence to social rules and norms as morally good, without questioning the legitimacy of such rules. Only in late adolescence are people able to base their moral judgment and behavior on abstract ethical rules.

All these different approaches focus either on preferences or on constraints (varying incentives). However, developments in cognitive psychology and microsociology show with increasing force that the way a situation is subjectively "framed" or "defined" heavily influences choice and behavior (De Dreu and Boles, 1998; Kahneman and Tversky, 1984).

solidary behavior was not obvious, but it was clearly there. The "situation" does not simply confront the individual who has certain preferences with possibilities and restrictions in choosing according to these preferences. Framing processes are likely to enhance certain preferences and push others into the background. The same happens to constraints. Some are amplified in the individual's perspective; others are only vaguely perceived. It has long been recognized that there is a subjective element in the way the world is seen. However, the developments in cognitive psychology and microsociology go beyond this basic insight into the importance of the subject. First, goal-framing processes are likely to be influenced by transsituational factors pertaining to the cultural and institutional contexts and to personality traits of the individual (Clark, Mills, and Powell, 1986; Hofstede, 2003; Miller, 1984; Mühlau and Lindenberg, 2003; Van Lange, 1999; Van Lange and Liebrand, 1991). Second, it has been found that cognitive processes are intertwined with motivational processes as a result of the fact that cognitive processes are heavily influenced by goals (Fitzsimons and Bargh, 2003; Gollwitzer and Moskowitz, 1996). Both facts point to complex interactions between cognitive, situational, and transsituational factors, and not merely to a subjective "filter" between the individual and the situation. This opens the door to a fresh look at the question when and under what conditions individuals show solidarity. The question now focuses on the possibility that individuals can have different *core motivations* for which the goals and preferences, the perceived constraints, and the pieces of memory and knowledge are activated inside the individual cluster in such a way that the principles of behavior seem to be thoroughly different from those associated with other core motivations. This perspective also draws attention to the possibility that incentives may have perverse effects. For example, we know from the research on intrinsic motivation that money as an incentive for the performance of activities may change the core motivation and thereby actually reduce rather than increase the likelihood of the activity being performed (Deci, Koestner, and Ryan 1999; Fabes, Fultz, Eisenberg, May-Plumbee, and Christopher, 1989; Frey and Jegen, 2001).

These insights run in part against the traditional view of economists and many rational choice sociologists that an individual's behavior is mainly governed by one core motive (self-interest) that must be channeled by the proper incentives. It also runs against the traditional sociologist's view that individuals are governed by one core motive (to conform to norms), which must be channeled by socialization. The Nobel Prize-winning economist Buchanan expressed this new insight, which is consistent with the metaphor of Jekyll and Hyde, very well when he maintained that "the constraints, rules, and institutions within which persons make choices . . . can and do influence the relative importance of the separate motivational elements" (as cited in Mansbridge, 1990, p. 21).

Another prominent suggestion in this direction has been to introduce multiple selves into the theorizing on economic modeling. Here, the individual is seen as a collection of selves, a person governed by different core motives. Of particular interest is Margolis's model containing a self with social and a self with egoistic motives (Margolis, 1982). The assumption of such different motives is in line with social psychological research on the self (for an overview, see Oyserman, 2001). But Margolis's underlying model is one of rational choice to be either social or egoistic. There are some rules that regulate the "efficient" allocation of resources to each of the selves. For example, a "self" with social motives will spend a certain amount of money on helping other people. The more often it has done so in the recent past, the more likely it is that the "self" with selfish motives will come to the fore, and vice versa. This view of multiple selves has the obvious advantage that it seems a literal translation of the Jekyll and Hyde idea. However, this and many other multiple selves models retain a view of rationality (utility maximization with farsightedness) that is independent of core motivations. In these models, core motivations are assumed to be fully represented by sets of preferences. There is no interaction between motivation and the kind of rationality. For example, in Margolis's model, in order to allocate a "marginal dollar," an individual has to compare the utility derived from social (i.e., altruistic) preferences to the utility derived from selfish preferences, and he or she spends the money where it gives the highest return in terms of utility. How does the individual do this? Are the criteria for the comparison independent of the situation? Seemingly, for Margolis, the perception of the decision situation is unaffected by the kind of motivation. Years after writing his 1982 book, Margolis observed himself that "I've become much more aware of the need to augment the mechanical calculus of rational choice with allowance for how flesh-and-blood cognition and perception actually work" (Margolis, 1990, p. 244).

Clearly, psychological theories are relevant here. However, psychological theories of prosocial behavior often deal with multiple motives (or "orientations") without elaboration of clear mechanisms that link the situational context to core motivations. For example, theories of personality identify relevant traits for prosocial dispositions (such as various subscales of the Big Five; see Matthews and Deary, 1998; van der Zee and Perugini, this volume) but do not tell us much about the influence of the context on prosocial behavior or the influence of the interaction between context, disposition, and prosocial behavior. Similarly, theories of self-categorization deal with differences in motivation on the basis of identity (Hogg, 2001). However, the link between situation and prosocial behavior is not elaborated. The large body of literature on helping behavior (see Bierhoff, 2002; Latané and Nida, 1981; Schwartz and Howard, 1982) shows more concern for the role of the situation (for

is focused on just one kind of solitary behavior and, despite the original emphasis on the situation, has mainly led to the identification of relevant person-related aspects of helping behavior (such as perception of need, taking responsibility, self-efficacy, empathy) (Bierhoff, Klein, and Kramp, 1991). Psychological studies on solitary behavior (such as dual-concern theory) (see Pruitt and Rubin, 1986) point to many important factors, and recent developments in dual process theory (see for example Strack and Deutsch, 2004) make it clear that selfish versus prosocial does not coincide in any way with rational versus emotional. These theories are certainly important for any theory of prosocial behavior, but they generally lack elaboration of integrated motivational-cognitive mechanisms that generate different core motivations. As argued above, without the description of such mechanisms, it is difficult to come to a comprehensive view of the generation of various forms of solitary behavior in various social contexts. Interest in the description of such mechanisms can be found more frequently among sociologists who are concerned with the microfoundations of social behavior.

The crucial question then is, how can it be that the same individual's behavior can be determined by such different sets of motivations? And, conversely, how can it be that within the same situation different people display different levels of solitary behavior? Clearly, inputs from both psychologists and sociologists are needed to solve these puzzles.

Overview of the Theoretical Framework Used in this Book

In the remainder of this chapter we present a general framework for the study of solitary behavior that leaves room for inputs from psychology and sociology. This framework is not to be seen as a complete theory that fully elaborates the mechanisms through which actors' personality characteristics and the characteristics of their social, institutional, and cultural contexts shape solitary behavior. We leave this task to the chapters that are presented in the remainder of this book.

In Chapter 2, Lindenberg provides a more elaborate version of this framework and of a specific version of a goal-framing theory that explicates the mechanisms through which the situational context shapes the subjective definition of the situation and the individual's actions. What the chapters of the book have in common is more modest than this elaborate version. It is a shared framework that contains the key elements of the framing approach to solitary behavior, depicted in Figure 1.1.

The main elements in this framework are the characteristics of the acting "person," characteristics of the situation in which the behavior




FIGURE 1.1. A General Framework for the Study of Solitary Behavior

solitary. Below, we discuss the elements of this framework and their relations with each other.

First, by solitary behavior, we mean the following kinds of behavior (see Lindenberg, 1998):

Cooperation. This refers to a *common good situation*. Ego and Alter both belong to a group that produces a common good. Ego will contribute to the common good even if an individual can free-ride without negative consequences to him- or herself.

Fairness. This refers to a *sharing situation*. If there are joint divisible benefits and costs, and if Ego is the one who can divide them, he will not seek to maximize his share of the benefits and minimize his share of the costs, but take his "fair share" of both (what the "fair share" is varies, but is mostly situationally fixed by norms).

Altruism. This refers to a *need situation*. Ego will help Alter in times of need (what constitutes need and how much help is minimally expected for solitary behavior varies).

Trustworthiness. This refers to abstaining from the *temptation to breach* implicit or explicit agreements or promises. An actor will refrain from hurting others even at a cost to him- or herself.

Considerateness. This refers to the avoidance of an offense and to making up when things go wrong (*mishap situation*). This kind of solitary behavior involves taking the experiences of one's interaction partners explicitly into consideration. Acts can turn out to go against the expectations of solitary behavior, even if this was not intended. A person may have been unaware that a certain action was offensive to an interaction partner or may have had a mishap that turned out to go against the other person's expectations of solidarity. In that case, an actor will show that he or she meant to act differently (or would have acted differently if he or she had been aware of the offensiveness of the actions, or was for other reasons unable to avoid acting in this way), that he or she feels sorry that it turned out that

she will not be able to keep to the agreement, the actor will warn others in advance, so that they can mitigate the damage.

We argue that the extent to which an actor shows solidarity is shaped by the actor's "definition of the situation" (see Lindenberg, this volume). The definition of the situation can be regarded as a motivational-cognitive process that serves three functions. First, it structures and organizes the actor's subjective perception of the situation; second, it links the actor's selective perception to motivation (i.e., it is linked to certain overriding goals); and third, it is linked to a mental "model" of the social relationship with the partner in any given interaction. Framing thus governs which aspects of the situation are both cognitively and motivationally prominent.

The general framework also includes the idea that solitary behavior takes place (or fails to take place) in the context of a subjectively perceived *relationship* with its own expectations and identities. For example, an individual's goal frame could be "to act appropriately" and the cognitive elements that are associated it. The question of what would constitute appropriate behavior in this situation would be answered by the mental model of, say, a friendship relationship and the norms and expectations associated with such a relationship. For the explanation of solitary behavior, it is important to have some indication of what the most important kinds of relationships are. Interestingly, there is quite a bit of agreement between sociology and social psychology regarding the categorization of social relationships into four fundamentally different kinds of relationship: Fiske (1991) distinguishes "communal sharing" (unity, community, undifferentiated identity), "equality matching" (balanced reciprocity among equals), "market pricing" (calculated exchange), and "authority ranking" (hierarchically ordered statuses and differences). Fiske's four "models" of social relationships are used by many psychologists who study social relationships. A related set of supposedly universal social relationships is often used in sociology. In traditional sociology, Durkheim (1964) distinguished "mechanic" and "organic" solidarity, where mechanic solidarity refers to a high level of largely unreflected solitary behavior that is directed only at in-group members with similar social and cultural characteristics, as in "primitive" societies. Organic solidarity is a more widely cohesive but also weaker form of solidarity where actors are willing to behave solidary even toward socially or culturally dissimilar counterparts. It is the form of solidarity that according to Durkheim is necessary to hold together modern societies with a large degree of social differentiation and diversity. In modern sociology, Lindenberg (1998) aims to ground the distinction of relationships in a behavioral theory based on framing. He distinguishes

group over individuals and dyads, and high expected sacrifice for group members in case of need; for example, a fire-fighting team), *weak solidarity* (with equity as the distributional norm, primacy of individuals, and dyads over the group, and low expected sacrifice for others in case of need; for example, partners in a law firm), *opportunistic relationships* (relationship in which everyone seeks to maximize his or her own outcome without concern for the other; for example, spot market), and *status relationships* (in which one defers to the other, at times also called *authority relationships*; for example, the boss-employee relation).

It is important to emphasize that the "mental models of a social relationship" are a part of the *subjective* perception of a given situation by a certain actor (see Lindenberg, this volume). Therefore, two actors may disagree about the kind of social relationship they are in. For example, Person A may regard Person B merely as a business partner, whereas Person B may perceive her relationship with Person A to be more than this (e.g., a friendship). Furthermore, the categorization of Fiske is only one possible dimension of the "mental model of a social relation." For example, another dimension may involve the question of whether two interaction partners perceive themselves as "partners" (having a common goal) or as "competitors" (having different goals). Again, this dimension implies a *subjective* definition by given actors. For example, Person A and Person B may agree that they are friends but still define a common bicycle trip very differently. While Person A may think that they have a common interest ("having a nice day"), Person B may define the situation as a competition (i.e., a bicycle race). Thus, Person A and Person B have very different expectations about the speed of the bicycle trip and whether the faster one should wait for the slower one (another example: a well-known cartoon shows a man and a woman having sex with each other. The man shouts out proudly "I am first").

To summarize, the degree of solidarity of a given actor in a given situation depends on his or her subjective definition of the situation. This subjective definition implies motivational and cognitive aspects (e.g., What are my goals? What do I perceive in the situation? What am I particularly sensitive to?) as well as the mental model of the relationship (e.g., Who am I in relationship to the other? Is the other person my friend, my enemy, or my competitor? What is expected of me? What do I expect from the other?). Neither of these is necessarily tied to conscious awareness.

Our framework holds that this subjective definition of a given situation is influenced by both the person and the situation in which the person is acting. This idea is not new. Kurt Lewin (1936) already saw behavior as a function of person and situation. So far, however, it has not been applied systematically to the study of various aspects of different core motivations and their relation to solidarity behavior. The term

agreeableness, or conscientiousness, as well as the skills and abilities of a certain actor (e.g., medical expertise when trying to help a sick person) or an actor's learning history (e.g., an employee's experience with his employer). In order to distinguish more easily between purely situational factors (such as the presence of others in the situation) and more stable social influences across situations (such as institutional and cultural influences), we speak of the "social context" in which these different elements interact. Whereas social psychologists tend to focus on circumstances in the situation, sociologists tend to investigate structural and institutional determinants (e.g., Has an employee a tenured position or not?). On an even more macroscopic level, some chapters of our book also deal with cultural determinants of solidarity behavior. Hence, for our book, the two headings of "person" and "social context" serve the function of organizing and structuring the many independent variables that were used by the different authors and were aimed to encourage researchers to take into account both groups of variables.

Overview of the Chapters of this Book

We conclude this introduction with a brief overview of the various chapters and how they relate to the general framework of our book. All authors share the aim of explaining solidarity behavior through an analysis of the impact of personality characteristics and context conditions on the institutional, social, and cultural levels using cognitive and motivational filters (framing and mental models) on solidarity behavior. The authors differ, however, in the emphasis they put on particular elements of our general framework. Part I of the book contains chapters that deal with the micromechanisms of solidarity. Here, a closer look is taken at the mechanisms that shape the microlevel individuals' definition of the situation and translate this definition into solidarity behavior. Each of the subsequent parts of our volume puts the main emphasis on one of the major groups of independent variables in our general framework: personality, social relations, institutional context, and cultural context.

Part I on micromechanisms opens with Lindenberg's discussion of his specific goal-framing theory. He argues that three fundamental different ways can be distinguished in which people frame social situations, corresponding to the hedonic motive "*to feel better right now*," the more long-term goal "*to improve one's resources*," or the normative motive "*to act appropriately*." Lindenberg proposes a theory of the mechanisms that drive frame selection, frame change, and decision making within frames. He elaborates how, according to his theory, each of the "master frames" may lead actors to behave solidarily, but for dif-

In Chapter 3, Flache and Macy compare Lindenberg's approach theoretically to another general behavioral theory, reinforcement learning theory. They use game theoretical modeling and computer simulations to identify the conditions under which learning mechanisms may lead to long-term solidary behavior in certain simple social exchange situations. Basically, they find that the two theories generate consistent predictions for a large range of situations. But they also point to two differences. First, goal-framing theory argues that actors' aspirations for the outcomes of an exchange may be shaped by their perception of the situation and of the partner. In reinforcement learning theory, these aspirations are initially arbitrary and develop in the course of the interaction. Second, learning theory may be less pessimistic about the chances of relationships recovering after periods of a mutual lack of solidarity.

In Chapter 4, Fetchenhauer and Dunning focus on an aspect of mental models that was only implicitly addressed in the preceding chapters. The authors investigated how actors estimate other people's solidary behavior. Clearly, expectations about others' solidarity shape decisively how we define the relationships we are in and, accordingly, our solidary behavior. Fetchenhauer and Dunning report on experimental research showing that most people expect others to show less solidary than they do. The authors review a number of different theoretical explanations for this "holier than thou" effect and discuss how future research can give new insight into which of these different explanations is best able to account for this effect.

Part II of the book focuses on the effects of personality characteristics on solidary behavior. In Chapter 5 van der Zee and Perugini review studies of a range of personality characteristics that have been distinguished in personality psychology. The authors show that the influence of personality on prosocial behavior is likely to run via goal-framing processes and via mental models. The three master frames distinguished by Lindenberg (Chapter 2) seem to be particularly useful in tracing these links. In interaction with situational factors, personality traits make it more likely that a goal frame will come up in a particular situation (thereby influencing prosocial behavior), and other traits are likely to influence the mental models within goal frames. Goal-framing processes can thus also explain why stable personality traits do not necessarily lead to trait-consistent behavior across situations.

In Chapter 6, Veenstra combines effects of personality variables on solidary behavior with effects of the psychosocial environment. He applies this perspective to solidary behavior of adolescents, putting particular emphasis on the distinction between prosocial and antisocial behavior of adolescents, which, he argues, cannot simply be treated as two sides of the same coin. Based on the book's general framework, the author proposes a heuristic to investigate the relationship between indi-

configurations of prosocial and antisocial behavior, on the other hand. In a nutshell, he argues that both prosocial and antisocial behaviors can be seen as strategies through which adolescents aim to achieve various forms of well-being, such as excitement (stimulation), material goods (comfort) and status. In this perspective, personality traits such as self-control or aggressiveness develop in early childhood in interaction with the home situation. These traits then operate as resources or liabilities that shape adolescents' frames and mental models of their relationships with peers, and thus affect whether adolescents perceive that they obtain their goals optimally using prosocial or antisocial strategies, or a combination of both.

Part III of the book shifts the focus to the social context, in particular to how the content and networks of social relations shape solitary behavior between those actors who are embedded in the relations. In Chapter 7 Buunk and Dijkstra treat infidelity in intimate relationships as a particular form of unsolidary behavior. They argue that the mental model of an intimate relationship is specific and different from that of other relationships. In this mental model, fidelity is viewed as a crucial form of solitary behavior. The authors argue that the emotional importance of fidelity results from pressures toward optimal reproduction strategies in human evolutionary history. They show, on the basis of previous research, that the level of fidelity in intimate relationships may be explained as the outcome of an exchange process in which the partners develop and co-ordinate their commitment, mutual expectations, and relationship-specific norms over time. In this process, certain frames become or fail to become stabilized by both dispositional factors (e.g., self-esteem and emotional stability) and situational conditions (e.g., "opportunity") of the partners. In Chapter 8, van der Vegt and Flache likewise address effects of social relations on solitary behavior, but in the different context of work teams. They focus on two aspects of social relations in the workplace that are becoming increasingly prominent in modern organizations: High interdependence among organizational members and diversity of work teams in terms of ethnical background, gender, age, skills, and abilities. The authors review recent research that showed how solidarity thrives mainly in teams with a proper match between interdependencies at the level of work tasks and interdependencies at the level of joint outcomes (e.g., group rewards). Diversity may promote solidarity when this match exists, but it can be disruptive when it does not. Van der Vegt and Flache show that these findings can be theoretically integrated on the basis of Lindenberg's framing approach. Broadly, they argue that interdependence in outcomes leads workers to frame their situation in terms of solidarity with the group, but this frame can only be sustained when it is backed by factual task interdependencies. Workers may

solidarity frame dominates, but diversity may impose counterproductive boundaries between group members when there is little attention to the group goal.

Part IV of the book emphasizes effects of the institutional context. The chapters in this part address solitary behavior in organizations. In Chapter 9 Sanders, Flache, van der Vegt, and Van de Vliert consider three partially overlapping forms of employees' embeddedness in organizations: Institutional embeddedness refers to formal rules, such as promotion schemes or payment systems; network embeddedness pertains to the pattern of informal social relations between employees; temporal embeddedness is the duration and expected time horizon of the employment relationship. In line with the recent trend in the organizational literature, the authors focus on solitary behavior of employees with regard to the organization. They compare and contrast the theoretical views of principal-agent theory, a prominent approach in organizational economics drawing on orthodox rational choice theory, with the perspective of goal-framing theory on the effects of embeddedness on employee solidarity. The authors review a range of previous empirical studies on the effects of the three forms of embeddedness and evaluate the predictions of both theories in the light of the empirical evidence. Broadly speaking, Sanders and her co-authors argue that much of the evidence related to organizational solidarity is consistent with both approaches, but they also point to some phenomena that contradict the principal-agent perspective. They show how, in these cases, it seems possible to resolve the contradiction with the view of goal-framing theory that formal and informal rules imposed by the management shape how employees perceive their relationship with the employer, which, in turn, strongly affects the extent to which employees are willing to act in solidarity within the firm.

In Chapter 10, a similar theoretical perspective is taken by Karr and Meijs, in which they study solidarity in voluntary organizations. They examine what creates sustained motivation to volunteer in a particular organization. Making use of Lindenberg's application of goal-framing theory, they distinguish between extrinsic motivation and two forms of intrinsic motivation. The authors then relate these forms of motivation to particular management strategies of voluntary organizations (membership management and program management). The core idea is that voluntary organizations appeal to all three kinds of motivation, but they do so with different emphasis and thus with different conditions for the sustainability of motivation. Organizations that apply membership management aim to elicit commitment mainly by focusing on the volunteers' enjoyment-based intrinsic motivation. For example, such organizations might stress the "fun" and social contacts that arise from the volunteer activity. By contrast, program management emphasizes

motivation as well as extrinsic motivation (such as gaining experience useful for one's career). These differences appeal to different kinds of volunteers and thus are likely to lead to different recruitment strategies.

Part V of the book concentrates on effects of the cultural context on solidarity. In Chapter 11 van der Zee investigates the conditions under which cultural minorities may act in solidarity toward institutions of the larger society. She focuses on the question of which mental models of relationships are activated if people are in a normative frame. This depends, she contends, mainly on the kind of identity that is salient in a given situation. It is argued that immigrants' perception of their relationship with the society in which they live may be shaped by the extent to which they are integrated into relevant social groups (e.g., work teams, school classes) that extend the borders of the cultural minority. This integration, van der Zee contends, may reduce the weight that people attach to normative obligations of the minority culture and may increase attention for the normative demands of the larger society. Drawing on social identity theory, van der Zee proposes a number of intervention strategies aimed to strengthen identification with social groups that cross the minority boundaries.

In Chapter 12, Fetchenhauer and Wittek turn to differences in solidarity between countries. They use international survey data to measure and compare levels of fair share behavior (e.g., paying taxes) in various countries. The authors first show that their measure of fair share behavior at the country level is clearly related to the economic performance, level of trust, and crime rate of a country. They proceed to explain differences in fair share behavior. They found that there is less fair share behavior in countries whose cultures emphasize authoritarian educational goals, notably countries with a Catholic confessional history and low levels of political democratization. In terms of our general framework, the results of the study by Fetchenhauer and Wittek suggest that in such countries people perceive their relationship with society as a whole as an authority relationship. Accordingly, the normative obligation to show solidarity toward society as a whole may in these countries only be followed when sufficient control and sanctions are in place. Conversely, in countries with a more liberal culture, people, in their relationship with society, may attach a stronger weight to the goal to act appropriately and, therefore, to not harming the interests of the government and other citizens.

In the Chapter 13 (the final study of effects of culture), cross-national differences in solidarity, especially regarding strong and weak solidarity (which are based on different goal frames, see Lindenberg, 1998), are examined. Van de Vliert and Lindenberg argue that, when means are scarce, extreme climates generate a high demand for cooperation in coping with climatic challenges and are thus likely to foster

across groups. The richer countries with extreme climates become, the more likely that strong solidarity will give way to weak solidarity (and thus a shift in goal framing). Empirical studies support this view.

In the last chapter of this book, Bierhoff and Fetchenhauer discuss how the goal-framing theory used in the studies presented in this book relates to a number of other metatheoretical paradigms that have been developed within different social sciences. They start by discussing the relationship of Lindenberg's goal-framing theory with the selfishness assumption of neoclassical economics, normative game theory, and classical rational choice theory. They then relate the goal-framing approach to functionalistic sociology, to Freud's psychoanalytic theory, to personality psychology, and to social psychological theories of prosocial and solitary behavior. Lastly, they compare the assumption of Lindenberg's theory with explanations of altruistic behavior that have been developed within evolutionary biology and evolutionary psychology. By comparing the framing approach with other metatheoretical paradigms, Bierhoff and Fetchenhauer emphasize the integrative potential of this approach, but also point to areas in which the theory needs further elaboration.

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